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Abstract 
To understand why all new light rail transit (LRT) projects under development in Canada are 
carried out in public-private partnership (P3) rather than through the traditional mode (public 
administration) that prevailed in the past, this research explores three light rail projects currently 
underway in Edmonton, Ottawa and Toronto. We study the arguments surrounding each 
decision leading to the choice of the P3 governance model. We show that in all cases, it is 
possible to observe the mechanisms of policy transfer, whether voluntary or coercive. 
Moreover, the argument used by local actors to justify the choice of P3, although similar in 
several respects, still forms a unique combination of justifications for each case, which leads us 
to believe that P3s are a versatile policy instrument. These findings demonstrate the importance 
of taking into account policy transfer at the municipal level and not only transfers that take 
place between national states. 
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1. Introduction 
Several cities in Europe and North America have recently acquired new light-rail transit 
(LRT) systems. Some also speak of a renaissance of this mode of transport (Layton, 2002). 
This moving infrastructure, which is sustainable and highly visible, gives an image of 
dynamism and modernity to the cities that have implemented it. Edmonton, Ottawa and 
Toronto are planning to build new LRT lines. So far, Canadian light-rail projects have been 
built and operated under the responsibility and management of the public sector. However, 
these cities plan to build their new projects in public-private partnerships (P3) yet, according 
to the literature on the development of public transit in North America, P3s are a rarity for this 
type of policy (Cohn, 2006; Phang, 2007, p. 214). In fact, a total of 5 LRT projects are 
currently underway in Canada and they are all developed in P3. We question this new 
predominance of public-private partnership for the implementation of new LRT lines in 
Canada as a radical and widespread change. Our research attempts to answer the following 
question: “How is it that the LRT development projects in Canada that were, until the 2000s, 
still handled by the public sector are now built in public-private partnership? Why is there 
such a generalization of a phenomenon, which was rare in North America before that date?” 
By analysing how three municipal governments (in two provinces) have adopted the P3 
model, we can provide some explanation as to the generalization of this mode of governance 
for these projects. To do this, we formulate two hypotheses: H1: the new dominance of the P3 
instrument for realizing LRTs can be explained in part through the mechanism of policy 
transfer. H2: The P3 model has established itself as a new instrument of public policy in the 
case of light-rail through its versatile nature. Through three case studies conducted through a 
literature review, document analysis and comparison between each other, we investigate these 
hypotheses. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
When looking for a theoretical foundation for this study, we first tried to find a public 
administration theory to explain and predict the new predominance of P3s for LRT projects 
and the changeover from an “all public” era before to an “all P3” era afterwards. As no theory 
has seemed convincing to explain and predict the phenomenon that interests us, we came to 
build our own theoretical framework using theoretical tools stemming from two approaches to 
public administration, namely policy transfer and policy instruments. 
2.1 Policy transfer 
Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, p. 344) define policy transfer as “[…] a process in which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or 
place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in 
another time and/or place”. They distinguish two types of policy transfer: voluntary and 
coercive. Voluntary transfers include cases where policies implemented elsewhere were 
discussed by politicians for their potential use in another political system (ibid., p. 345). 
Coercive transfers are those where a government forces (explicitly or not) another one to 
adopt a particular public policy (ibid., p. 347). For example, the federal government ratifying 
an international treaty that forces the provincial governments to act in a certain way.  
2.2 Policy instruments 
Several authors have discussed policy instruments from a functionalist perspective. According 
to proponents of this literature, policy instruments are perceived by policy actors in a 
functional outlook, they are chosen according to their functions rather from a rational 
perspective (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007, p. 3). One of the frequently used definitions is 
that of Howlett (1991, p. 2) indicating that policy instruments are: “[…] the generic term 
provided to encompass the myriad techniques at the disposal of governments to implement 
their public policy objectives”. Howlett (ibid., p. 4) tells us that the choice of instrument for 
policy makers is circumscribed by the social, economic and political conditions surrounding 
the adoption of the policy. The choice of policy instruments is constrained to certain 
instruments or a particular instrument and can be greatly influenced by the specific context 
(ibid.). In addition to those that classify the types of instruments according to the functional 
approach, some have looked in particular on the effects of instruments and the power relations 
they articulate. Proponents of this approach believe that the instruments can reveal changes in 
public policy and allow to analyse the transformation of the contemporary state (Lascoumes 
and Le Galès, 2004, p. 357). They define policy instruments as “a device considered as both a 
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social and technical tool that organizes specific social relations between public authorities and 
the recipients based on representations and meanings it conveys” (ibid., p 13). The choice of 
the type of instrument, its specific properties and the justification given by actors to explain 
their choice are important for Lascoumes & Le Galès who consider these facts “more 
revealing than statements of motivations and subsequent discursive rationalizations” (ibid., p. 
28). 
 
 5 
3. Operational framework 
3.1 Light rail transit 
Light rail transit (LRT), streetcars or trams (known as “tramway” in French) are sometimes 
considered to refer to different means of transportation. In our case, we consider them to be 
the same. According to De Leuw, Gather and Company (1976, p. 10), the classical definition 
of modern LRT is:  
Light rail transit is a mode of urban transportation utilizing predominantly reserved but not 
necessarily grade-separated rights-of-way. Electrically propelled rail vehicles operate singly 
or in trains. LRT provides a wide range of passenger capabilities and performance 
characteristics at moderate costs. 
This definition reminds us of two important aspects of LRTs compared to subways: they can 
share their way with other types of vehicles and are less expensive1.  
3.2 Public-private partnership (P3) 
Collaboration between the public sector and the private sector are not new, but in the past, 
government projects remained under the control of public actors. With public-private 
partnerships (P3), this control has become more diffuse, the private sector now sharing a part 
of it. For this research project, we use a particular definition of P3s typically used in the 
public administration literature. Just like several authors (Cohn, 2006; Hodge, 2004; Phang, 
2007; Rouillard, 2006), we are referring to a complex and long-term contractual agreement 
for the realization by the private sector of a project providing a public service or public 
infrastructure.  
According Siemiatycki (2005, p. 70), in the Canadian context, budget cuts at the federal and 
provincial levels and the ensuing offloading of responsibilities to the municipalities are 
putting cities in a difficult position with respect to their responsibility for providing public 
transit services. Under these circumstances, it may seem attractive for governments to transfer 
these projects to the private sector, since generally public transit runs at a loss and require 
large subsidies (Cohn, 2006, p. 14). In addition, as Hodge mentioned (2004, p. 46): “[t]he 
private finance of public infrastructure presents government with a mega-credit card facility 
                                                
1 On average, the cost per mile of transit is (in constant 1990 dollars): Bus on it’s own right of way: 10.24 M $ 
(9.4 M CHF); LRT: 26.4 M$ (23,6 M CHF); Subway: 128.2 M$ (114 M CHF) (Zhang, 2009). 
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that is clearly attractive in the short term”. Moreover, LRT projects represent a very important 
type of P3, when measured by the size of the required investments (Phang, 2007, p. 229). 
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4. Methodology 
In order to enable our analysis to draw general conclusions on LRT projects in Canada, we 
decided to treat multiple cases in order to attempt to ensure the generalizability of our results 
with the intention of obtaining conclusions that are valid across Canada. We have therefore 
had to consider cases in several provinces. But there are currently only 5 LRT projects 
currently under development in Canada2 and they are all using the P3 model. Therefore, we 
chose to study at least 3 cases from no less than 2 provinces. Following an evaluation of the 
documentation available for the 5 cases, we selected three LRT projects that are under way: 
the Southwest LRT in Edmonton, the Confederation line in Ottawa and the Toronto 
Crosstown line. For each of these new LRT P3 projects, we developed a case study on the 
project's history, its political context as well as the decision-making process leading to 
choosing the P3 model for the implementation of a new LRT line. To produce each case 
study, we analysed the deliberations of local governments, local newspapers as well as official 
documents. We then compared our three case studies as well as the case of Vancouver, which 
was already well documented in the academic literature, in order to identify commonalities 
and differences.  
4.1 Analytical grid 
In order to verify the presence of policy transfer and the versatility of P3s in our case studies, 
we have developed an analytical grid. This grid is divided in two parts, one for each of our 
hypotheses. The grid is the result of a hypothetico-inductive approach where, as Chevrier 
(2009, p. 73)  reminds us of  “the development of the research problem does not occur from 
the structuring of general concepts and broad proposals but is achieved in the iterative 
formulation of questions from the meaning given to a concrete situation” 3. With this in mind, 
we first carried out the press review for the case of Edmonton. Throughout the preparation of 
this press review, as we gathered articles and the history of the light rail project took shape, 
we put these data in relation to the six questions proposed by Marsh and Dollowitz (2000, 
p. 8) in order to study policy transfer. Once we completed the press review, we developed a 
unique grid taking into account the elements identified in the case of Edmonton. We then 
reviewed the articles documenting the case of Vancouver in light of these questions and 
developed our analysis grid for hypothesis 1 (see table 1). In the end we have not fully 
                                                
2 Burnaby, Edmonton, Ottawa, Toronto et Waterloo 
3 Our translation. 
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incorporated the questions of Dollowitz Marsh since the data collected in Edmonton and 
Vancouver did not allow responding all of them properly. 
Table 1 – analytical grid for hypothesis 1 – policy transfer  
  Variable Indicator 
Refers to other exemplar P3 
LRT cases 
Local elected officials mention other cases of P3 LRT in the justification for choosing the P3 
model, recall the positive experiences of other P3 LRT projects as best practices 
Refers to other cities, other 
types of P3 projects 
Local elected officials mention other cities or other types of P3s in justifying the P3 model, 
remind us of positive P3 experiences in other cities for other types of projects 
Mimetic isomorphism Demonstrated isomorphism by replicating an institution from another case by referring to it 
directly 
Learning mechanisms The presence of study trips, lesson sharing, visits to other similar projects, participation in 
conferences 
Coercive transfers Mention of an obligation to proceed with P3, imposition of the P3 model by the federal 
government, imposition of the P3 model by the provincial government, conditional funding 
Reasons why political 
stakeholders participate in 
policy transfer? 
Justifications presented by the actors explaining why they should be inspired by other cases 
and effectively transfer policy 
If there is policy transfer, 
what is transferred? 
Management mode, mode of governance, process for selecting bidders, etc. 
If there is transfer, who is 
involved, who are the actors 
of policy transfer? 
When indicators of the presence of policy transfer are detected, who is involved? Elected 
officials, manufacturers, consortia, other levels of government, interest groups, consultants? 
Presence of private actors in 
the policy transfer 
Reference to reports by consulting firms, contract with consulting firms, role of firms bidding on 
P3, presence of unsolicited P3 proposals. Presence of a virtuous circle where private actors 
involved in the decision to go with a P3 are also players in the implementation of P3s 
 
We followed a similar approach to develop the grid used to analyse the second hypothesis. 
We first identified the qualities attributed to P3s in the academic literature, which we 
organized thematically (internal and external qualities of the instrument). We then juxtaposed 
this long list to the qualities that have emerged from the case of Edmonton and Vancouver. 
Our analytical grid for hypothesis 2 (see table 2) is the result of the fusion of qualities 
expressed in the scientific literature and those that emerged from reading the articles in the 
case of Vancouver and during the creation of the press review for the Edmonton case. For 
example, we added to the grid an indicator to capture the presence of unsolicited turnkey 
projects which appeared in the Edmonton press review, but that was not mentioned in the 
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scientific literature considered. We also added to the grid an indicator to capture all the other 
elements representing the versatility of P3s which did not appear in the grid, but that would be 
found in our cases as well a space to take note of the type of P3 agreement reached. 
For each of our case studies, we applied and completed the analytical grid, which allowed 
highlighting the important points to test our two hypotheses. By bringing together and 
comparing the results obtained for each case, we can test our hypotheses. For the policy 
transfer, we can conclude on the probable validity of our hypothesis if there were tell-tale 
signs of policy transfer in each case. For the versatility of P3s, we can conclude that they are 
indeed versatile if the combinations of arguments leading to the choice of P3 are different for 
each case studied. 
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Table 2 – analytical grid for hypothesis 2 – versatility of P3 as a policy instrument  
Variable Indicator 
Unsolicited turnkey P3 LRT 
project proposal by the 
private sector 
The local press or official documents mention the existence of proposals for unsolicited 
turnkey P3 LRT projects by the private sector. 
Axiological motives 
(ideological choice, value 
based choice, political 
choice) 
Presence of normative ideological justifications in the discourse of local elected officials to 
justify the P3 model. E.g. open market, improved governance, political complexion of the 
project. 
Delegitimization of traditional 
instruments, breaking with 
the past 
Using arguments that delegitimize the traditional model (public) for the construction of LRTs 
while legitimizing the P3 model. The presence of justifications relating to a rupture with the 
past 
Internal qualities of the P3 
model: project completed 
faster 
The presence of justifications relating to timeliness and avoidance of delays by the private 
sector in the discourse of local elected officials to justify the P3 model  
Internal qualities of the P3 
model: private financing 
The presence of justifications relating to the contribution of private financing and the 
reduction of public debt to justify the P3 model 
Internal qualities of the P3 
model: less expensive, more 
effective 
The presence of justifications relating to savings compared with traditional public project in 
the discourse of local elected officials to justify the P3 model. Appeal to the more favourable 
cost / benefit ratio associated with the P3 model 
Internal qualities of the P3 
model: higher quality 
infrastructure 
The presence of justifications relating to better production quality compared with traditional 
public project in the discourse of local elected officials to justify the P3 model  
Internal qualities of the P3 
model: risk transfer, fixed 
costs 
The presence of justifications relating to risk sharing, the possibility of fixed costs compared 
with traditional public project in the discourse of local elected officials to justify the P3 model 
Other justifications in favour 
of the P3 model 
Take note of other justifications developed in the discourse of local elected officials and 
identify those that are common / unique between different cases. 
Type of P3 agreement Take note of the type of P3 agreement reached  
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5. Discussion and results 
5.1 Policy transfer 
Through the construction of our case studies, we have taken note of elements specific to each 
case that demonstrated some aspects of policy transfer previously identified. We note that in 
our three cases and in the case of Vancouver, we detected several features identified as 
indicators of policy transfer. As shown in table 3, our results demonstrate that the choice to 
develop the new LRTs in Canada using the P3 model can be partly explained through the 
mechanism of policy transfer resting as much on voluntary transfer by local governments as 
on coercive transfer from higher levels of government. Admittedly, the presence of policy 
transfer in each case may be variable, probably stronger in Edmonton and Ottawa than in 
Toronto or Vancouver, but nonetheless, we detect the presence of policy transfer for all LRT 
P3 projects analysed. In addition, some elements of policy transfer are present in all cases. 
Indeed, in the three P3 LRT projects that we studied, policymakers refer to other cases of 
LRT P3 projects to justify their decisions to opt for the P3 model in their own undertakings. 
These justifications are reflected in our analytical grid by the presence of voluntary transfer in 
all cases analysed. The analytical grid also reveals that in all cases, local decision-makers 
justify the choice of the P3 model by referring to conditional funding by senior levels of 
government (federal or provincial) based on the P3 model. This means that in all cases, if the 
light rail project was developed through the traditional mode (public sector), the project 
would not succeed in obtaining funding from senior levels of government or would get 
inferior funding. This is reflected in our analytical grid by the presence coercive transfer in all 
cases analysed. It is therefore possible to say that the decision to develop the new LRTs in 
Canada using the P3 model can be partly explained through the mechanisms of policy transfer 
and relies on both the voluntary transfer between local governments and the coercive transfer 
from higher levels of government. As these elements recur in all cases, and that the federal 
government plays a similar role in all provinces in the funding of public transit we believe it is 
possible to say that coercive transfer plays a role in the choice of the P3 model for all new 
LRT projects in the country. This is not very surprising if one takes into account an 
announcement in 2006 by the Minister of Finance of the Conservative federal government 
stating that: “[t]he Government will also encourage the development and use of P3 best 
practices by requiring that P3s be given consideration in larger infrastructure investments that 
receive federal program funding” (Flaherty, 2006, p. 68). 
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Table 3 – Results for hypothesis 1 – policy transfer   
        Variable Present in 
Edmonton 
Present in 
Ottawa 
Present in  
Toronto 
Present in 
Vancouver* 
Refers to other exemplar P3 LRT 
cases ✔ ✔ ✔  
Refers to other cities using other 
types of P3     
Mimetic isomorphism ✔   ✔ 
Learning mechanisms ✔ ✔   
Coercive transfers ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Reasons why political stakeholders 
participate in policy transfer?     
If there is policy transfer, what is 
transferred? ✔    
If there is transfer, who is involved, 
who are the actors of policy transfer? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Presence of private actors in the 
policy transfer ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Number of indicators in each case 7 5 3 4 
* Based on a literature review of academic articles studying the case of Vancouver 
 
Despite the fact that two key elements of our analytical grid (the voluntary transfer and 
coercive transfer) have proved useful for the analysis since they were present in all cases, it is 
important to mention that two elements of our analytical grid were not detected in any of the 
cases. Indeed, we have not registered any instances where policymakers discuss other cities 
that have adopted the P3 model in general, they refer specifically to P3 LRT projects carried 
out in other cities, but do not appeal more broadly to other cities who have had recourse to 
P3s in other sectors. This is somewhat surprising since we expected that actors participating in 
the policy transfer of the P3 model for LRTs would refer to examples of municipal 
governments that have successfully used P3s in other sectors such as recreation or wastewater 
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treatment, which are common in Canada. The absence of reference to these other types of P3 
projects in the rationale leads us to believe that policy transfer of the P3 model is specific to 
each policy sector, which could explain why the actors have only used cases of public transit 
P3s in their arguments. The specific nature of the cases used as examples could be explained 
by the involvement of the actors of P3 policy transfer in a policy network or policy 
community built around the public transit sector. 
Another element of our analytical grid remained empty. Our analytical grid included a section 
to capture the reasons given by the actors in explaining the transfer of the P3 model, but none 
of our sources mention an actor relating explicitly that they implement a policy transfer or are 
inspired by this concept. This is no surprise, but it demonstrates that the policy actors are not 
explicit on the policy transfer in which they participate. Is it because they do not realize they 
are implementing policy transfer or because they prefer to conceal the fact or is it simply the 
result of our methodological choices? As this item was not part of our main inquiry 
attempting to establish the presence of policy transfer rather than explain the rationale behind 
it, we are not able to answer this question, but future research could investigate further this 
aspect by questioning the actors about their participation in policy transfer through interviews. 
We also note the singular presence of private sector actors such as consultants, suppliers, 
engineering firms and banks in the process a policy transfer in the case of Edmonton, Ottawa 
and Vancouver. This enables us to corroborate the results of Holden (2009) and Stone (2004)  
who reported the particular presence of private actors in the policy transfer when it comes to 
public-private partnerships. 
5.2 Policy instruments 
We also believe that the fact that P3 has established itself as a new instrument of public policy 
in the case of LRTs in Canada can be attributed to its versatility as a policy instrument. That is 
to say that P3 can take many forms and adapt to many different situations. By studying each 
of our cases, we have taken note of the arguments used by the actors to defend their choice of 
the P3 model for new LRT projects. As shown in table 4, some arguments are used in all the 
cases studied (delegitimization of traditional instruments, private funding, savings and 
increased efficiency, risk transfer and fixed cost), but some arguments are used only in some 
cases, each case involving a unique combination of specific features of the P3 policy 
instrument. The disparity observed in the various combinations of arguments used to justify 
each of our case studies as well as Vancouver reveals a certain versatility of P3s. 
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In addition to the differing arguments in the cases studied, the very form of P3 also differs. 
Indeed, the Edmonton P3 will see the establishment of an DBFOM4 type agreement where the 
private partner will be responsible for design, construction, part of the financing, the daily 
operations of the LRT as well as its maintenance while the P3 in Ottawa and Toronto are 
developed using to the BDFM5 model for which the public partner retains responsibility for 
daily operations, demonstrating another aspect of the versatility of P3s for the LRT sector. 
However, our finding of P3 versatility is less sustained than in the case of policy transfer. 
Obviously, the fact that four of the nine elements are present in all the cases studied and that 
three of the nine elements are also found in the case of Vancouver demonstrates the existence 
of some general argumentation on the choice of the P3 model.  
                                                
4 Design Build Operate Finance Maintain 
5 Design Build Finance Maintain 
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Table 4 – results for hypothesis 2 – versatility of P3 as a policy instrument  
Variable Present in 
Edmonton 
Present in 
Ottawa 
Present in  
Toronto 
Present in 
Vancouver* 
Unsolicited turnkey LRT P3 project 
proposal by the private sector ✔ ✔   
Axiological motives (ideological 
choice, value based choice, political 
choice) 
 ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Delegitimization of traditional 
instruments, breaking with the past ✔ ✔ ✔  
Internal qualities of the P3 model: 
project completed faster ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Internal qualities of the P3 model: 
private financing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Internal qualities of P3 model: less 
expensive, more effective ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Internal qualities of P3 model: higher 
quality infrastructure    ✔ 
Internal qualities of P3 model: risk 
transfer, fixed costs ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Other justifications in favour of the P3 
model  ✔  ✔ 
Type of P3 agreement DBFOM DBFM DBFM DBFM 
Number of indicators in each case 6 8 5 7 
* Based on a literature review of academic articles studying the case of Vancouver 
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6. Conclusion 
According to our analysis, the new prevalence of the P3 model of governance observed in the 
implementation of new LRT projects in Canada, which we dubbed the “transition to the P3 
model for LRTs in Canada”, can partly be attributed to the mechanisms of policy transfer. 
Since we detected and documented the presence of indicators of policy transfer as presented 
by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) in all cases studied, as well as in Vancouver's case, we believe 
we have demonstrated the contribution of this phenomenon to the new enthusiasm for P3s in 
this policy sector. In studying the argumentation for the choice of the P3 model, we also 
revealed that in all cases a unique combination of arguments appeared, which shows the 
versatility of P3 model. It is not possible to directly link the versatility of P3s to the choice by 
the actors for this mode of governance, but we can say that the comprehensive list of 
arguments goes far beyond the mere economic rationale for the provision of private funding 
which is generally minimal in the end. Nevertheless, we still conclude that the combination of 
policy transfer and P3 versatility that we have demonstrated are certainly factors that enhance 
the attractions unique to this mode of governance and thus come to help explain some of the 
new prevalence of the P3 model for LRTs in Canada since the 2000s. 
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